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Abstract—This paper presents a new framework for dis-
tributed intrusion detection based on taint marking. Our system
tracks information flows between applications of multiple hosts
gathered in groups (i.e. sets of hosts sharing the same distributed
information flow policy) by attaching taint labels to system
objects such as files, sockets, Inter Process Communication (IPC)
abstractions, and memory mappings. Labels are carried over the
network by tainting network packets. A distributed information
flow policy is defined for each group at the host level by
labeling information and defining how users and applications
can legally access, alter or transfer information towards other
trusted or untrusted hosts. As opposed to existing approaches,
where information is most often represented by two security
levels (low/high, public/private etc.), our model identifies each
piece of information within a distributed system, and defines
their legal interaction in a fine-grained manner. Hosts store and
exchange security labels in a peer to peer fashion, and there
is no central monitor. Our IDS is implemented in the Linux
kernel as a Linux Security Module (LSM) and runs standard
software on commodity hardware with no required modification.
The only trusted code is our modified operating system kernel.
We finally present a scenario of intrusion in a web service running
on multiple hosts, and show how our distributed IDS is able to
report security violations at each host level.
I. INTRODUCTION
As most of today’s organizations rely extensively on dis-
tributed services where sets of machines are constantly and
publicly exposed to the internet, firewalls, anti-virus software
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) have become com-
mon additions to most of these services. However, current
IDSes are mostly based on network traffic analysis and mal-
ware signatures, and little research has focussed on detecting
intrusions in distributed systems. With the growing number
of distributed environments and services across the internet,
interest has been focussed on the extension of MAC [1],
[2], [3] and information flow control [4], [5], [6] policies
to distributed systems so as to control interaction between
applications of multiple machines. However, such systems
enforce strict policies such as Multi Level Security (MLS)
and are not practical in all situations, as these can potentially
break functionalities by blocking information flows. In this
paper, we propose a distributed model allowing for rich policy
specification and fine-grained information flow tracking. Our
contributions are:
1) The design of DBlare, a distributed intrusion detection
system based on taint marking.
2) An implementation of DBlare in the Linux kernel.
3) A case study of DBlare on a distributed web service run-
ning off the shelf components on commodity hardware.
II. APPROACH OVERVIEW
We have developed a framework to detect intrusions in dis-
tributed systems. This framework is based on information flow
monitoring by attaching taint labels to containers of informa-
tion (i.e. system objects containing information such as files,
memory pages and the like). Labels contain meta-information
representing pieces of information contained in tainted files.
As shown in previous work [7], [8], exploiting security flaws
spawns abnormal information flows between objects of the
operating system, which we can detect using this framework.
Most of today’s companies rely extensively on networks and
distributed systems running databases, web servers and other
services. Such services often run proprietary software from
various sources, which makes static analysis impossible unless
all the software editors cooperate. Even in the case of open
source software, security flaws do occur quite frequently as
the code is rarely audited. Dynamic tainting of information
at the operating system level, and at the network packet level
allows us to detect illegal information flows amongst users
and/or programs distributed in hosts, regardless of whether or
not the software involved has been analysed for correctness
and security. Hosts are gathered in groups of multiple hosts
sharing a distributed information flow policy. Taint labels
are propagated with every information flow between system
objects of the same host (files, sockets, shared memory) as
well as over the network through CIPSO labels. As described
later in Section IV, the security policy is decentralized in
each host of a group and verified independently by the kernel
reference monitor of each host, in a distributed manner. It
defines how information can flow between users, applications
and hosts. Our kernel reference monitor is implemented as a
Linux Security Module (LSM) and tracks access to resources
at runtime, using access control hooks. Access is always
permitted as we do not enforce any policy, but rather raise an
alert in the case of an illegal information flow. A key difference
with MAC in our approach is that we can observe indirect
information flows. For instance, when an access to a resource
containing some information is granted by MAC mechanisms
to a process pa, it could then share this information with
another process pb through IPC. The information may then be
written to a file fa by pb whereas a direct write access to the
same file by pa would have been denied by the MAC policy
in the first place. Contrary to MAC mechanisms, the model
we propose is able to track such indirect information flows
and their legality w.r.t. a specified information flow policy.
III. BACKGROUND: INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL AND
TAINT ANALYSIS
In 1976, Denning introduced “a lattice model of secure
information flow” [9]. She defined it as a mathematical
framework suitable for formulating the requirements of se-
cure information flow among security classes. Most of the
lattice-based information flow models can be represented in
Denning’s framework. This formal model involves objects,
processes and a set of security classes. Each object belongs to a
security class, subjects are objects, and processes are the active
agents responsible for all information flows. The set of security
classes encompasses the concept of security classifications.
Denning also introduces a “flow relation” and the “class
combining operator”, which together with a set of security
classes forms a Lattice. In 1997, Myers and Liskov proposed
a decentralized model for information flow control [10]. This
model applies to systems with mutual distrust and decentral-
ized authority. It differs from multi-level security models by
allowing users to declassify information in a decentralized
way and improves support for fine-grained data sharing. This
model allows users to associate confidentiality and integrity
labels with data and to restrict information flows based on
these labels. With Decentralized Information Flow Control
(DIFC), the policy is partially delegated to the individual
applications [4]. It is a key difference with Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) systems, where an administrator sets a system-
wide policy. Current decentralized information flow control
(DIFC) models can be categorized into three types: language
level, operating system level and architecture level [11]. Lan-
guage level solutions [10], [12] rely extensively on type system
changes and modify the program structures. Such solutions
provide no guarantees against security violations on system
resources (such as files and sockets). Operating system level
solutions [4], [5], [6] rely on page mappings and are inefficient
to accurately monitor information flows into applications as
those do not have access to inner data structures [11]. Archi-
tecture level solutions [13], [14] are able to track data labels
within applications but require trusted software to manage the
labels. Laminar [11] is a hybrid solution combining language
level and operating system level information flow control,
but still requires modifications in the code of the programs.
Flume, Asbestos and Histar [4], [5], [6] are implementations
of distributed information flow control at the operating system
level. Flume [4] has been implemented in Linux and uses the
standard operating system abstractions commonly found on
UNIX systems (processes, pipes, etc.). In Flume, processes
are confined according to a flow control policy. Histar [5]
is an operating system aiming to minimize the amount of
code that must be trusted. It provides a secure operating
system using mostly untrusted user-level libraries (the only
fully trusted code being the kernel). It uses Asbestos [6] labels
on six OS level object types (threads, address spaces, seg-
ments, gates, containers and devices). Recent works regarding
the monitoring of information flows include Panorama [15],
TaintCheck [16] and TaintDroid [17]. Panorama is a system-
wide information flow tracking model based on dynamic taint
analysis. TaintCheck dynamically taints incoming data from
untrusted sources (e.g. network) and detects when tainted data
is used in any way that could be an attack. Both use full system
emulation at the instruction level to provide very fine-grained
approaches. However, the main limitation of such instruction-
level models is a very high penalty in terms of performances; a
slowdown of 20 times in average when using Panorama, and a
slowdown of 1.5 to 40 times when using TaintCheck are to be
expected, according to their respective authors. TaintDroid [17]
is an information flow tracking system for realtime privacy
monitoring on smartphones. It is based on taint marking at
four different levels of granularity, respectively at the variable,
message, method and file levels. TaintDroid has a performance
overhead of 14% on the CPU. However, TaintDroid is focussed
on the Android platform using the Dalvick interpreter and
therefore it does not apply to native applications, which
represent most of the software present on standard desktop and
server operating systems. Our approach uses dynamic tainting
of OS level objects (processes, files, sockets, IPC, memory
mappings and pipes) to track both native and interpreted1
applications and does not require any modification or instru-
mentation of the code nor architecture emulation, resulting in
a reasonable performance overhead (for brevity, this aspect is
not covered in this article). As opposed to existing approaches,
where information is most often represented by two security
levels (low/high, public/private etc.), our model identifies each
piece of information within a distributed system, and defines
their legal interaction in a fine-grained manner.
IV. DISTRIBUTED INTRUSION DETECTION
In previous work [7], [8] we have been using taint marking
techniques along with an information flow policy to detect in-
trusions and confidentiality violations at the operating system
level. This current work extends the previous model to allow
for intrusion detection in distributed systems.
A. Overview of Blare
Blare attaches labels to containers of information, i.e.
system objects involved in information flows such as files,
processes, memory mappings, socket buffers and others. We
also refer to those labels as tags. Information sources, such
as data contained in files, are tainted by initially attaching
information tags (also called itags) to their containers. Infor-
mation tags contain meta-information describing the origin
1We track the actions of the virtual machine in the case of interpreted code.
of information as well as its nature, active code or passive
data, respectively represented by two sets X and I. Code is
considered active when it is being executed by a process, it is
otherwise considered as passive (stored) data. This distinction
follows Denning’s assumption that “processes are the active
agents responsible for all information flows”. Information
tags are sets of meta-information describing the content of
containers, namely any combination of elements of I and X ,
that we note ℘pIYX q2. The execution of code is represented
formally by the following function, mapping passive data to
running code:
exec : I Ñ X
When a piece of information i P I is executed by a process
(e.g. the content of an executable file) its information tag
is updated with x “ execpiq, x P X . Elements of X in a
process’s information tag indicate which code3 is currently
being run, whereas elements of I indicate passive data3 which
have been read by this process. Elements of X in other
containers keep tracks of which processes (running tainted
code) wrote information in the container. Information tags
are updated after every information flow, and are a maximal
estimation4 of the current content of their associated container
at any given point in time. Figure 1 summarizes the tainting
rules used in our model. Policy tags are sets of sets, (i.e.
Operation i P I x P X
Read taint check legality & discard
Write taint taint
Execute taint with x “ execpiq discard
Fig. 1. Tainting rules: when a process reads, executes or writes from/towards
a container, distinct tainting rules apply. Taint means that the destination
process or container gets tainted by the meta-information. Discard means the
destination process or container does not get tainted by the meta-information.
elements of ℘p℘ppI Y X qq) each describing which combina-
tions of information can legally be contained in the containers
they are attached to. The host’s information flow policy is
thereby distributed in all the containers of the system. An
information flow towards a container is legal if and only if
its updated information tag is included in (at least) one of the
sets of its policy tag after the flow occurred (except on read
operations involving elements of X , in this case the legality
check is performed on the fly, and only elements of I are
kept in the updated tag, as shown in Figure 1.). Policy tags
of processes are dynamically determined at execution time as
the intersection of the policy attached to the program’s file
and the policy attached to the current user. This point will be
further detailed in the following section.
2Powerset ℘pAq denotes all the subsets of A.
3It is an overestimate based on the potential information hold by the process.
4After each information flow occurs, the updated information tag is the
union of the source’s information tag and the destination’s information tag.
This conservative approach may be an overestimation of the actual content,
but it is necessary as it is unpractical to observe actual information flows [14].
B. Distributed model
In our current research, we have now extended the previous
model in order to detect intrusions in distributed systems
composed of multiple hosts gathered in groups. Hosts of the
same group share a common information flow policy. The
policy is distributed in each host at the container level. Tags
are carried over the network using CIPSO5, an IETF draft
proposing a “Commercial IP Security Option“. CIPSO is a
security option of IPv4 packets allowing to carry security
labels between hosts.
Trusted hosts run our modified kernel, and communicate
over secure channels (e.g. VPN, IPSec etc.) to ensure the
integrity of labels is kept. Each host of a group is identified
by a unique id hk P H. For any given host hk, we define Ik
to be the set of all passive data managed by this host, and
Xk the image of Ik through the exec function, i.e. the code
originating from this host which may be executed by processes
on any host. Ik and Xk are partitions of respectively I and X
representing all the information of the group:
I “
ď
hkPH
Ik ^ X “
ď
hkPH
Xk
Recall that information tags are sets of elements in ℘pI Y
X q, identifying passive data and active code residing in
containers. The originating host of an element of pIYX q, i.e.
the host managing a given piece information, is determined
by the following relation:
Host : pI Y X q Ñ H
An information flow towards a container is legal if and only
if its information tag Ti is included in at least one of the sets
of its policy tag Tp, which we note Ti Ď Tp. This applies
to all kinds of containers (i.e. processes as well as passive
containers). We define the boolean relation Legal as follows:
LegalpTiq ô Ti Ď Tp
Ti Ď Tp ô DA P Tp|Ti Ď A
Processes are responsible for all information flows. For each
set of the policy tag of a given process:
‚ Any element a P X , allows communication with other
processes executing a on any other host of the group.
‚ Any element a P I allows information a to flow from
another host of the group towards the current process.
The information flow policy Pgroup of a group of hosts
ph1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , hN q, identified at each host’s level is defined as
Pgroup “ pPh1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,PhN q
The local information flow policy on any host hi, is ex-
pressed independently for users, programs and passive contain-
ers (e.g. files), and is specified in the policy tags of containers6.
It is defined by the triplet Phi “ pPChi ,PUhi ,PΠhi q where:
5https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-cipso-ipsecu
rity-01
6Policy conflicts are resolved manually (automatic resolution is left for
future work).
‚ PChi
is the set of all the policy tags attached to passive
containers (mostly files) on host hi.
‚ PUhi
is the policy attached to local users on host hi.
‚ PΠhi
is the policy attached to executable code on host
hi.
Processes run code on behalf of a user. Their policy tags
are determined dynamically by PUhi and PΠhi , at execution
time, as the intersection of the policy attached to the user on
behalf of which the program is being executed, and the policy
attached to the executed program.
C. Distributed security tokens
Information tags have dynamic sizes, and can therefore
require variable amounts of space depending on the situation.
Due to size restrictions on IPv4 options, it may not always be
possible to directly map information tags to CIPSO options on
network packets. Therefore, we have introduced a distributed
security token protocol allowing hosts of a group to exchange
security labels in a peer to peer fashion, as shown in Figure 2.
Security tokens are images of information tags through the
relation H as follows, where Θ is the set of all possible CIPSO
tokens:
H : ℘pI Y X q Ñ Θ
HOST A HOST B
token_query()
token_send()
CIPSO (token)
Fig. 2. P2P token exchange: host A labels network packets with a CIPSO
option containing a security token. If Host B does not find it in its local cache,
it asks host A for resolution using the protocol defined in this section. Note
that H is not injective since the size of θ is smaller than the potential size
of information tags.
We use tokens as security labels on network packets so
as to carry taint information between the multiple hosts of a
group. Recall that information tags are dynamic: their content
is updated after every information flow. Therefore, processes
often need to update the labels they attach to network packets:
after every information flow, if the information tag of the
process has changed, a new token is created for this process,
corresponding to its new information tag. Every host maintains
a local cache of sent and received tokens for each remote host
of the group, as shown in Figure 3. We note senthArhBs and
recvhArhBs, respectively the cache of tokens sent to host hB
and the cache of tokens received from host hB on host hA.
The sizes of sent and received caches are equal and noted ℓ.
Caches contain xkey : valuey pairs in (Θˆ℘pIYX qq. Token
resolution and token creation (described below) ensure that for
each pair of hosts (hA, hB), senthB rhAs is synchronized with
recvhArhBs. Token resolution is performed over an alternate
secure channel, using unlabeled packets (i.e. no CIPSO op-
tions). Possible operations on both caches are: creating a new
entry pCq, overwriting an existing entry pOq and reading an
existing entry pRq.
hostA hostB
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
Sent
Reeived
To hostB
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
To hostC
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
From hostB
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
From hostC
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
Sent
To hostA
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
To hostC
Reeived
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
From hostA
<id1 : {I1}>
<id2 : {I2}>
. . .
<idN : {IN}>
From hostC
ℓ
ℓ
Fig. 3. Distributed token protocol. Hosts maintain caches of sent and received
tokens for each host of their group.
a. Token resolution: when a process receives a network
packet labeled with a security token, it needs to resolve it in
order to be able to append the appropriate taint data to its
information tag. Token resolution is defined by the following
relation:
resolve : Θ Ñ ℘pI Y X q
Token resolution can be done directly if the token is in the
local reveived tokens cache. Overwise, it is necessary to query
the remote host using the protocol defined below.
b. Token creation: when a process on host hlocal updates
its information tag, the following actions are necessary before
sending data to any destination host hdest.
1) Create a new token tknew “ Hpitagq where itag is
the current information tag of the process, and H is a
cryptographic hash function.
2) Read local cache entries (R) and check for collisions7
with tknew: senthlocalrhdestsrtknews may already exist
as a key for a different information tag.
3) In case of collision, overwrite (O) existing values and
set flag to O_REPLACE.
4) Otherwise, create (C) tknew in senthlocalrhdests and set
flag to O_NEW.
5) Send token to remote host (using the protocol defined
below and the appropriate flag).
c. Token exchange protocol: hosts of a group exchange
tokens using a protocol based on the two following operations:
‚ Function token queryptoken, hostq: query host about
token. The remote host replies with token send and
sets a flag to either O_NEW or O_REPLACE. When
O_REPLACE is set, a previous cache entry with the same
key already exists and must be replaced. Otherwise, it is
a new entry.
‚ Function token sendptoken, flag, hostq: send the pair
ptoken,Hptokenqq to host with flag in {O_NEW,
O_REPLACE}.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The reference monitor for this model has been implemented
in the Linux kernel version 3.2 as a LSM module (Linux
7H is a hash function, however collisions may occur in some rare cases.
Security Module), and is available as an open source project8.
Labels are stored in the extended attributes of the filesystem,
in the security namespace, as arrays of integers of variable
size (i.e. these arrays have dynamic sizes). Information tags in
kernel memory have been implemented as doubly linked lists
of integers. Policy tags have been implemented as linked lists
of binary trees (red black trees), one binary tree per set, policy
tags being sets of sets. Checking the legality of an information
flow is an operation whose complexity is in Opkˆℓˆlog2pnqq,
where k is the length of the involved information tag, l is
the number of subsets of the policy and n is the maximum
size of the sets of the policy. Information flows are tracked
between files, memory mappings, pipes, message queues,
shared memory and sockets (both AF_UNIX and AF_INET).
Network packets are labeled using the Netlabel subsystem, an
API in the Linux Kernel implementing CIPSO (Commercial
IP Security Option). CIPSO option size is limited to 40 bytes
(320 bits), which limits the amount of meta-information we
are able to carry over the network. Information tags are sets of
32 bit integers, therefore CIPSO options can only contain less
than 10 information tag elements per network packet. In order
to overcome this limitation, we have designed a distributed
security token management protocol, allowing any host of a
group to securely exchange security labels. However, for the
sake of simplicity, our current implementation labels network
packets with information tags of up to 320 distinct values,
by using fixed-size bitmaps. Our experiments in the following
section have been developed as as a proof of concept on this
current implementation, as those only require a limited number
of distinct labels. Further experiments will be conducted in
future work, with a full implementation, in order to measure
the impact of our distributed token system on the performances
of the operating system (i.e., CPU, memory and network
latency).
VI. EXPERIMENTS
The following section describes our experiments. We have
set up an attack scenario targeting a group of trusted hosts
running our modified kernel. This group is composed of three
hosts: a web server, a database server and a client, all three
connected to the same Virtual Private Network (VPN). The
web server (Apache) hosts two websites, isolated in two virtual
hosts www1 and www2 (Apache vhosts
9.) The database server
(PostgreSQL) hosts two databases, storing data of the two
virtual hosts: db1 stores information related to www1, and db2
stores information related to www2. Connections to www1
are allowed from the outside. Connections to the other hosts
of the VPN and to www2 are forbidden from the outside.
The following shows how it is possible with our intrusion
detection model to detect illegal information flows between
hosts caused by an intrusion. We used Debian Squeeze virtual
guests running as KVM [18] instances. The two websites run
Wordpress. The website www1 runs the e-commerce plugin
8http://blare-ids.org
9From http://www.apache.org: the term Virtual Host refers to the
practice of running more than one web site on a single machine.
Foxypress10. We used the version 0.4.2.2 of this plugin, which
is vulnerable to an upload exploit (EDB-ID: 19100)11. This
vulnerability allows for arbitrary file upload and remote code
execution.
A. Scenario
As shown on Figure 4, we labeled all the files of www1
and www2 as well as the PHP5 dynamic library (used by
apache to interpret PHP code) with distinct information tags
on the web server. On the database server, we labeled the
PostgreSQL binary as well as two tables on each database. We
could label information at the table level by using the option
default_with_oids = on in PostgreSQL’s configura-
tion file. Object identifiers (OIDs) are used in PostgreSQL as
primary keys for system tables, as well as user-created tables
when using this option. Each table in PostgreSQL is mapped
to a file named after its OID. Thus, we could label the files
related to the supervised tables.
Host Files Itag Execution
Web server www1 i1 x1
www2 i2 x2
libphp5.so iphp xphp
apache2 ia xa
Database server db1: wp_users iu1 xu1
db1: wp_posts ip1 xp1
db2: wp_users iu2 xu2
db2: wp_posts ip2 xp2
postgres ipg xpg
Fig. 4. Labels on files
By default, both Apache and PostgreSQL create a new
process for each connection. Recall the exec function
from the previous section. When a process executes a
binary file (or the content of a dynamic library) labeled
with ik, its information tag is set to xk “ execpikq.
Therefore, both Apache and PostgreSQL processes always
have their information tags initialized to respectively
xa “ execpiaq and xpg “ execpipgq. We used the following
policy tag for both Apache and PostgreSQL processes:
P “ ttxa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1utxa, xpg, xphp, i2, iu2 , ip2uu.
Such a policy makes it illegal for any process running Apache
or PostgreSQL to hold information from both websites
simultaneously, or to run any code other than Apache and
PosgreSQL binaries and libphp5. When an external visitor
visits www1, the web server creates a new process for this
connection and reads files labeled with i1. It also maps
libphp5.so in executable memory pages which taints the
process with xphp. It queries the database server. The database
server forks a new process and reads information from db1.
At this stage, the information tag of the PostgreSQL process
is tainted with S1 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1u. After the
PostgreSQL process has responded to the Apache process,
both processes have equal information tags, as each process
10www.foxy-press.com
11http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19100/
labels network packets with a CIPSO option containing its
information tag (in a bitmap, as described in Section V).
When an internal host connects to the internal virtual host
www2, similar interactions happen between the hosts, and the
information tags of both processes handling the connection
are tainted with S2 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i2, iu2 , ip2u. In both
cases, information flows are legal, and so no alert is raised,
because information tags are subsets of the policy tags in
both containers: S1 Ď P ^ S2 Ď P .
B. Attack
The following attack leaks information from the private
web site www2 located on the intranet. The attacker runs
the upload exploit on the Foxypress plugin on www1 and
injects a malicious PHP file on the web server. We used
Metasploit12 to run the attack. After injecting the file, the
running web server process’s information tag was equal to
S1 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1u, and so was the information
tag of the malicious PHP file. From there, any illegal action
triggered an alert:
‚ Executing the malicious PHP file, which taints13 the
process’s information tag with execpS1q “ tx1, xu1 , xp1u
is illegal, as execpS1q Ł P
‚ Querying the database server to access data from
www2, which taints the process’s information tag
with S3 “ txa, xpg, xphp, i1, iu1 , ip1 , iu2 , ip2u is illegal as
well, as S3 Ł P .
Information tags are carried over the network through
CIPSO labels, therefore both the web server and the database
server raise an alert in the case of illegal information flow, as
both servers are affected by the attack: data from the database
server leaks, and the web server runs arbitrary code.
VII. CONCLUSION
Distributed systems are used all over the internet to provide
services involving a number of different software connected
together. New security flaws are discovered regularly, which
makes it challenging for system administrators to keep such
systems secured at all times. In this paper, we presented a
novel approach of intrusion detection in distributed systems
based on taint marking along with an information flow policy.
The policy for a group of hosts is distributed in each host at
the container level (i.e. files, processes etc.). CIPSO labels are
attached to network packets in order to carry security infor-
mation between hosts. Our kernel reference monitor has been
implemented as a Linux security module and uses efficient
data structures for runtime tainting (for the sake of brevity,
we have not include a performance analysis in this article). It
is used on each host of a group, and alerts are reported at each
host’s level with respect to its local information flow policy.
We have been running experiments involving a web service
distributed on several hosts, and we presented an example of
12http://www.metasploit.com
13Apache maps PHP files in executable memory pages (PROT_EXEC), like
it does with dynamic libraries.
application showing how our system is able to detect an attack
targeting private information by exploiting a vulnerability on
a web server.
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